Vol. 8 · No. 2 · 2002

Yiwei Zheng

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Abstract

1. Introduction
While the notion of "bad faith" remains stable in Jean-Paul Sartre's early philosophy, the notions of "pure reflection" and "good faith" undergo significant changes. In Being and Nothingness,[2] pure reflection was presented as a necessary but not sufficient condition for authenticity,[3] whereas in Notebooks for an Ethics,[4] 'pure reflection' and 'authenticity' seemed to refer to the same consciousness (although with different emphasis)[5] (NE, 12, 472-482, 515). In Being and Nothingness, the project of good faith was introduced as a corrupted mode of being, which, like bad faith, stands in contrast to authenticity (EN, 108-111; BN, 113-116), whereas in Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre did not seem to distinguish good faith from authenticity (NE, 12).