Vol. 10 · No. 1 · 2004
Being-looked-at
Ontological Grounding for an Ethics in Being and Nothingness

Michelle Darnell

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Abstract
The importance of freedom in Sartre's philosophy cannot be overestimated, and the understanding of Sartre's account of freedom is necessary for the understanding of Sartre's philosophy as a whole. In this article, I will show that there are two distinct, but related, notions of freedom used in Being and Nothingness,1 and will suggest that a clarification of the two notions will open the possibility of grounding Sartre's demand that each individual should promote the freedom of all Others.2 My approach answers a concern of other commentators, namely that while it is not too difficult a task to show the value of freedom, this is not the same as grounding the demand for the promotion or realisation of the freedom of others, which has in the past been proven to be a much more difficult task.3 Specifically, I believe that an inquiry into the ability to express freedom in the world will show an interdependency between being-for-itselfs that has not been explored by other commentators, an interdependency that justifies the claimed obligation to promote the freedom of Others.